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Hungry Corporations:

Transnational Biotech Companies Colonise the Food Chain

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Chapter 6:

Corporate Influence on International Regulatory Bodies

It is hard to arouse public interest in bodies such as Codex Alimentarius or the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, yet what they decide has profound implications for us all. Corporations, on the other hand, put much energy into lobbying international regulatory bodies to remove barriers to corporate globalisation.

6.1 Corporate influence at the World Trade Organisation (WTO)

The World Trade Organisation was born out of the highly contentious and lengthy Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1995, at the strenuous insistence of the US and the TNCs (see Chapter 2). It is the international body that regulates international trade and enforces trade rules. Member countries that do not open up to this forced 'right to trade' may be taken to the Dispute Resolution Mechanism of the WTO, which makes the WTO the only international agreement with the power to inflict punishments for non-compliance.

Corporations have penetrated the whole process of the WTO with well-organised and well-resourced lobbying groups. WTO rules give large transnationals a similar status to that of nations, which is perhaps hardly surprising since several of them are larger in financial terms than many countries (see Table 6.1). Over 500 corporate delegates attend the biennial WTO Ministerial Conferences as 'trade advisers', whilst some poor countries may have a single delegate trying to cover all the issues.

At the Seattle WTO Ministerial in December 1999, the US, Canada and Japan hoped to move the regulation of GMOs out of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and place it under WTO jurisdiction. This would have negated all the work of years of negotiation for an international Biosafety Protocol to the CBD. However, the breakdown of the Seattle talks, as well as the immediate reaction by Europe's environment ministers against the proposal, foiled this attempt, and the text for the Biosafety Protocol (the Cartagena Protocol) was finally agreed in January 2000. At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, however, an attempt was made by the US to put trade considerations ahead of international environmental agreements, including the Biosafety Protocol. The Ethiopian delegation led a Southern revolt against the proposal at the last moment and the attempt was foiled.[1]

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Table 6.1: Comparing the revenue of the largest TNCs with country GNP

Global Rank (according to revenue)	Company	Revenue for 2000 in US$ billion	Global Rank (according to GNP)	Country	GNP for 2000 in US$ billion
1	Exxon Mobil	210.392	21	AUSTRIA	228.140
			22	TURKEY	210.811
2	Wal-Mart Stores	193.295	23	DENMARK	185.238
3	General Motors	184.632			
4	Ford Motor	180.598	24	RUSSIA	179.325
			26	INDONESIA	169.295
			27	HONG KONG (as part of CHINA, P.R.)	165.956
5	DaimlerChrysler	150.069			
6	Royal Dutch/Shell Group	149.146	28	NORWAY	147.936
7	BP	148.062	29	FINLAND	146.030
			30	THAILAND	142.654
			31	GREECE	136.889
8	General Electric	129.853	32	SAUDI ARABIA	133.752
9	Mitsubishi	126.579	33		
10	Toyota Motor	121.416	33	PORTUGAL	120.932
			34	SOUTH AFRICA	120.693

Source: Data from Global 500 and IMF/WEO. [2]

Revolving doors at the WTO

The following examples indicate the lobbying power of US TNCs and the people who 'revolve' between government and TNC roles.

- The US Intellectual Property Committee is made up of 13 major US corporations including DuPont, Monsanto and General Motors. These corporations were instrumental in developing the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement which was included in the Uruguay round of the GATT (1985–94).[3]
- Monsanto has very close links with the US government. For example, when Robert Shapiro was chair of Monsanto, he was also the chair of the President's Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations.
- Micky Kantor, US trade representative for much of the Uruguay round of GATT trade talks, is now a board member of Monsanto.[4]
- Marcia Hale, former assistant to President Clinton and Director for Intergovernmental Affairs was then director of international government affairs for Monsanto.
- Claydon K. Yeutter, former Secretary of USDA, former US Trade Representative who led the US team in negotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and helped launch the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations, was as of February 1999 a member of the Board of Directors of Mycogen Corporation, whose majority owner is Dow AgroSciences, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Dow Chemical Company.[5]

6.2 Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) [6]

> *The TABD is much more than just another example of a corporate lobby group influencing and manipulating the political environment on behalf of its member companies – it has the advantage of having been initiated and nurtured by governments. Through the TABD, EU and US-based corporations develop policy demands which (parts of) the European Commission and the US government then attempt to implement.*
>
> Open letter sent to EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy, by 20 groups from 11 European countries, 26 September 2001

Some 150 corporate leaders are involved in the Transatlantic Business Dialogue established in 1995 between big businesses in the USA and the EU. They develop common strategies that are then communicated directly to high-level government officials, as the TABD enjoys close links with governments. It is well known for promoting the 'public–private partnerships' that have recently become an international bone of contention.

> The TABD has proven itself very apt in predicting the course of policy making in the EU and US, and has successfully diverted the flow of any policy discourse that would have posed a threat to its ultimate goal of no barriers to trade and investment in the transatlantic marketplace and beyond.[7]

TABD seeks to harmonise regulation in the EU and the USA with the aim of securing 'mutual recognition', or the acceptance by the EU of US rules developed on an issue, and vice versa. This would speed up the development of TNC-friendly legislation. According to the TABD's newsletter, its priority issues for 2001 included the WTO agenda, and targeting

> regulation's impact on business, including sector-specific concerns, the goal of 'Approved Once, Accepted Everywhere', and promotion of international standards and harmonisation in EU/US systems and procedures, such as transatlantic merger review.[8]

The TABD lobby in action

Following TABD proposals, a US–EU Summit in June 1999 agreed on a set of principles that established an Early Warning Mechanism for potential trade disputes. The Early Warning Mechanism is one of the routes that institutionalises TABD lobbying through existing transatlantic government structures, and the TABD is using it to attempt to obstruct or delay policies which its member businesses dislike. At its annual conference in Berlin in 1999, the TABD used the Early Warning Mechanism to attack the precautionary principle in trade, the EU Take-Back Directive, EU proposals to phase out hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), proposals to phase out animal testing, and the draft of the Biosafety Protocol.[9]

In efforts to further tighten corporate control, the TABD is calling for trade interests to be upstreamed in the decision-making process, for instance through 'trade impact assessments' for all regulatory and legislative proposals.[10]

- The TABD also seeks to establish rules for investment that would be applied globally.
- It warns against the use of science to block trade, calling for a convention to regulate this.

  > Appropriately, governments will continue to have the duty to protect the health and safety of their citizens. But scientific facts are just that – facts. Unless conventions are adopted on the regulation of science, varying systems could create unintentional trade barriers. Worse, others may use scientific standards intentionally to frustrate free trade. [11]

- It tries to block the introduction of any environmental protection initiatives that would interfere with international trade and seeks an agreement that would prevent multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and labelling regimes from interfering with the free flow of goods and services.[12]
- It has also called for the EU and the US to enforce implementation of the WTO's TRIPs agreement in developing countries.[13] If the TABD were to succeed in its aims, Europe would not be able to refuse US GM products. However, the TABD's strong efforts to advocate acceptance of biotech crops and food in Europe have so far met with little success in the face of strong public opposition. In the summer of 2001, the US government indicated its intention to step up the pressure.[14]

6.3 The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)

The FAO is a large United Nations organisation that represents a plethora of different viewpoints and interests on agricultural production and policy. It consequently displays a rather schizophrenic approach to genetic engineering. Its website shows an alarming juxtaposition between, on the one hand, an in-depth understanding of the problems that small farmers face (citing the green revolution as the cause of many of these problems), and, on the other hand, uncritical support for genetic engineering.

In the run-up to the World Food Summit in Rome, November 1996, and at the Summit itself, it became evident that industry and US-led lobbies were pushing for genetic engineering of crops as the best option to solve world hunger. The impact of this was not reflected in the Summit's official papers. Yet polarisation within the FAO remained. Speaking prior to the G8 Summit in Japan in June 2000, the FAO Director-General, Jacques Diouf, gave GM organisms his backing, saying new plant and animal varieties were needed to feed a burgeoning world population. He predicted that a shortage of land available for cultivation would make it impossible to feed the global population, expected to peak at 9 billion in 2050, without recourse to genetically engineered plants and animals.

However, just over a month later, FAO research contradicted his arguments. In July 2000, the FAO's Global Perspective Studies Unit published *Agriculture: Towards 2015/30*,[15] a report showing that, contrary to usual pro-biotech claims, there *would* be enough food to feed the world over the next half-century. The report specifically did not allow for future technological developments in crops, in particular GM crops, because of the ongoing uncertainties regarding the technical performance, safety and acceptability to consumers of GM crops.

The FAO was excited by the announcement of the mapping of the rice genome in January 2001, claiming it would 'provide us an additional tool to increase food production in the next 20 years as the population rises' –though such optimism was tempered by Devinder Sharma, a food and trade policy analyst from India, who cautioned that 'rice genome mapping cannot address the real issues of access and distribution that result in hunger'.[16]

Jacques Diouf seems to have come to similar conclusions when stating on 17 February 2001: 'Faced with the needs of the 800 million people who are suffering from hunger, we don't need GMOs.'[17] He referred to Indonesia where pesticide use had been reduced by 65 per cent while rice production had increased by 25 per cent between 1987 and 1992.[18]

The FAO postponed its Hunger Summit 2001 – also named World Food Summit: Five Years Later – until June 2002 in Rome. The Summit was meant to review the limited progress and achievements since the 1996 Food Summit and to make decisions for actions to be taken. As at the 1996 Summit, heavy agro-industry and business lobbying took place. This time it had clear results. Chapter 1, Paragraph 25 of the statement of the 2002 Summit reads:

> We call on the FAO, in conjunction with the CGIAR and other international research institutes, to advance agricultural research and research into new technologies, including biotechnology. The introduction of tried and tested new technologies including biotechnology should be accomplished in a safe manner and adapted to local conditions to help improve agricultural productivity in developing countries.[19]

6.4 Codex Alimentarius: UN body for food standards

> *The volume of world food trade is enormous and is valued at between US$300 billion and $400 billion.*
>
> Codex website

The Rome-based Codex Alimentarius Commission is a body jointly administered by the FAO and the WHO. Established in the early 1960s, it is responsible for setting internationally harmonised minimum standards on food safety and quality. 'The publication of the Codex Alimentarius is intended to guide and promote the elaboration and establishment of definitions and requirements for foods to assist in their harmonisation and in doing so to facilitate international trade.'[20]

Codex is powerful in that it is widely recognised, providing the basis for food safety standards in regional trade blocs such as NAFTA, the EU and the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum. Above all, the WTO explicitly recognises the standard-setting role of Codex. During the Uruguay Round of trade agreements in the lead-up to the establishment of the WTO, agriculture and food were for the first time incorporated under world trade rules. At the final talks in Marrakesh in 1994, two new agreements were added in order to prevent countries from adopting measures that could operate as discriminatory barriers to trade:

- The Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) Agreement allows governments to

take sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human health but seeks to prevent them from discriminating against any other party.

- The Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement is designed to ensure that regulations and standards, including labelling requirements, do not create 'unnecessary obstacles to trade'.

Codex plays a major role in defining and harmonising SPS and TBT standards for food safety and quality at international level (it has 169 member countries). It has also updated its own standards to reflect these WTO rulings.[21]

Codex has statutes, rules of procedure and two kinds of committee. There are five coordinating committees, one for each major region of the world. Subject committees are subdivided into two kinds: nine general subject committees (including pesticides, food additives, labelling) and sixteen commodity committees (including pulses, sugars, oils and fats, fresh fruits and vegetables).

The Codex Commission also publishes the *Code of Ethics for International Trade in Food*, which is meant to stop the dumping of poor-quality or unsafe food on international markets.

As the primary reference for the WTO in SPS measures, Codex has significant influence over national policies across the globe. Industry recognises its importance and is heavily involved in negotiations. Northern government delegations to Codex have included representatives of the largest corporate interests, among them Nestlé, Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Cargill and SmithKlineBeecham.

Looking, for example, at the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues (CCPR) – establishing maximum residue limits (MRLs) for pesticides in food – industry presence is striking. Lisa Lefferts of Consumer International reported:

> The Global Crop Protection Federation delegation, which represents the pesticide industry, included 30 members at the 1998 meeting. Three of the four members of the Swiss delegation represent industry (Novartis and Nestec/ Nestlé). Mingled into other delegations are representatives from Dow, Monsanto, and a multitude of multinational companies, from Avcare to Zeneca.[22]

After a long process, Codex formally adopted the 'Principles and Guidelines on Foods Derived From Biotechnology' on 9 July 2003. It sets out principles for risk analysis of GM foods and guidelines for the safety assessment of foods derived from recombinant DNA plants and microorganisms, including allergenicity and unintended effects.

6.5 The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)

In 1972, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was founded and in 1987 the World Commission on Environment and Development (the Brundtland Commission) produced the report, *Our Common Future*, which called for economic development to be balanced against the environment and the needs of future generations. Work to develop the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention on Climate Change (which targets industrial and other emissions of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide) culminated in the largest-ever meeting of world leaders, which took place at the Earth Summit – the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. At this summit, the CBD was signed by more than 150 governments.

The CBD calls for the balancing of conflicting requirements: conservation of biodiversity, its sustainable use, and equitable sharing of the benefits. It calls for the protection of the interests of indigenous peoples and local communities, yet refers to patents and biotechnology as means for exploiting biodiversity.

The CBD is legally binding and has 181 parties which are the nations that not only signed but also ratified it, accepting it as an internationally binding agreement. The US is not a party to the CBD, as it has not ratified this agreement. However, it is always present at the meetings with its handpicked delegations, which always include a large number of corporate representatives. Other countries have so far not challenged its right to intervene in the business of the Convention, although they have more than once prevented the US from subordinating the international environmental agreements to the trade agreements.

Industrial lobbying of the CBD

Industrial lobbying of the CBD has been prolific. Composed of many of the leading global corporations, the Business Council for Sustainable Development (BCSD) had unparalleled access to the conference secretariat of the Earth Summit in 1992.[23] That conference was completed with hardly a single reference to the responsibility of the multinationals for environmental degradation and social injustice, or to the need to limit their rights, except in the statements made by NGOs.

The BCSD has now acquired the grandiose title of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), which 'aims to develop closer cooperation between business, environment and sustainable development.'[24] It has 125 corporate members including Monsanto, Novartis and DuPont as well as Shell International, BP, General Motors and Rio Tinto.

The Rio Plus 10 meeting in Johannesburg in 2002 was predictably a major disappointment. Concentration of corporate power has increased considerably since 1992, with many takeovers, makeovers and mergers. Industry has managed to evade any major attempt to control its activities during the intervening decade. However, proposals were presented by a broad group of NGOs in Johannesburg for binding rules on corporate accountability. In addition, African networks used the summit as an opportunity to come together and build their strength.

The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety

The Biosafety Protocol is designed to protect biodiversity and its sustainable use from the potentially negative effect of the transboundary movement (i.e. trade) of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) which are defined as LMOs (living modified organisms). The Protocol also refers to human health and socio-economic impacts. It allows countries to invoke the precautionary principle and prevent the import of GMOs in certain cases.

Justifying US opposition to a strong Biosafety Protocol, Rafe Pomerance, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Environment and Development and head of the US delegation at the negotiations in 1999, stated simply: 'This is about a multimillion dollar industry.'

The Protocol should have been finalised in 1999 in Cartagena, Colombia. But for once the US and its friends – having come together as the Miami Group of the three major GM-exporting nations and their allies (the US, Canada and Argentina, supported by Australia, Uruguay and Chile) –had drastically miscalculated the strength of the South, where national negotiators had created the Like-Minded Group. In an effort to exclude almost every key issue from the Protocol, the US 'over-bullied' not only the South but all delegations, including the EU. The South did not give way and the talks finally collapsed when the Like-Minded Group stood firm.

> Their belittling us gave us a headstart in getting unobtrusively united. By the time they knew that we really knew what we were saying, we had cemented an African unity of purpose, and blackmail and intimidation directed at individual delegations in order to break up our unity always backfired.
>
> Tewolde Egziabher, biologist and chief negotiator, Like-Minded Group[25]

Following the collapse of talks in Cartagena and the failure of the WTO talks in Seattle in November 1999, there was hope that despite opposition from the Miami Group – at that time already without active support from Chile – a strong Biosafety Protocol could be established to ensure that environmental and health concerns could take precedence over free trade rules.

In January 2000, after five years of negotiations, 134 countries met in Montreal, Canada, under the auspices of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), in a final effort to establish an internationally binding Biosafety Protocol. This Protocol – officially to be called the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety – establishes an international framework of regulation for the safe handling, transfer and use of GMOs across national boundaries. Adopted on 30 January 2000, the Cartagena Protocol entered into force in September 2003, ninety days after the fiftieth country had ratified it.[26] This was in the same month as the WTO's Cancun ministerial, as if to underline the ongoing struggle for precedence between the two, which is set to intensify now the Protocol is actually in force.

The Protocol has set a new landmark in the development of multinational environmental agreements but it has also made history for other reasons. It was the first time in the history of negotiations for international treaties and agreements that the North had failed to dominate, while the South maintained a solid unity and refused to be bullied into submission.

The biotech industry lobbied heavily at the Biosafety negotiations. For example, in May 1997 at least 28 agrochemical/life sciences companies or company associations were present at the negotiations in Montreal. Of these, 22 were from the US and Canada. Monsanto alone sent 6 representatives to the meeting. Pro-industry lobbyists also attended meetings under the guise of anonymous-sounding political institutes and universities. Most African countries could only afford to send one delegate each. Thirty-one different industry groups were present in Montreal in January 2000 when the Biosafety Protocol was finally adopted.[27]

- **What has been achieved?**

The Biosafety Protocol agreed in Montreal is only a beginning. Although in its final form it offers more than many believed possible, many areas of the Protocol are weak and whole groups of GMOs have been excluded from risk assessment or advance notification. To this extent the industry's investment and efforts have paid off. But it was a victory for all those intent to ensure protection and sustainable use of biodiversity, that 'the Precautionary Approach (PA) became the guiding principle for the import of GMOs. The Protocol subjects imports to an Advance Informed Agreement (AIA) and secured its legal status in relation to the World Trade Organisation (WTO).' [28] Article 10.6 for Decision Procedure states:

> lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge shall not prevent [the importing country] from taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to

> the import of that living modified organism … in order to avoid or minimise such potential adverse effects.[29]

Though it appears straightforward, it is not easy to trigger the precautionary principle and prevent shipments of GMOs intended as food from entering a country. First, as explained by Dommelen,

> The PP [precautionary principle] may seem to imply that scientific knowledge is not required for its application, but this conclusion is misleading. In practice, the PP can only be triggered when sufficient reason exists to expect that some specific course of action will lead to 'a threat of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity'. Disagreement is likely to arise about what constitutes a sufficient reason for expecting such a threat. Policy makers will find that even scientific researchers are in disagreement about a qualified assessment of possible threats to biological diversity. This implies that a method must be found to make these scientific disputes productive for the purpose of applying the PP.[30]

Second, industry and US government representatives are known to pressurise any country trying to implement a moratorium on the import of GMOs (see chapters 7 and 8).

An example of appropriate use of the precautionary principle from 150 years ago

The precautionary principle made its first appearance more than 150 years ago in the context of urban public health. In 1854, a cholera epidemic in a specific neighbourhood in London led John Snow to suspect an association between the drinking water from a public water pump and the outbreak of cholera, although at this time no causal connection could be demonstrated. Nevertheless, he was able to convince the responsible assembly that the potential cost of closing the pump by removing its handle would be much smaller than the consequences of leaving [it] open, even if this decision might be wrong in the end. His theory of cholera as a waterborne disease proved correct and the plague ended. It was only 30 years later, however, that the bacterium *Vibrio cholerae* was discovered.[31]

The Cartagena Protocol also has provisions for the development of an international liability regime, the terms and extent of which are still being negotiated and need to be in place no later than four years after the Protocol has come into effect.

However, before they can ratify the agreement, many countries are obliged to frame national legislation to implement it, which in turn requires scientific, technical and legal capacity, for which they require funding, training and time. This provides plenty of opportunities for industry to intervene and undermine or take over the process. It also means the Protocol is delayed in coming into effect. Not all countries are in this position however: Bulgaria ratified early on because its laws only require a presidential signature; hence, although it has ratified, it has no law that complies with the Protocol.

Given that GM seeds imported for 'food, feed and processing' can be used for sowing, especially in times of shortages and crisis, it is a weakness of the Protocol that commodities are excluded from the strict AIA procedures and its risk assessments. Though the US, Canada and Argentine wanted commodities completely excluded from the Protocol, they are now covered by an extremely watered-down version of AIA, what some call 'AIA light'. Furthermore, the Miami Group refused to allow GM commodities to be labelled as such in shipments, which led to the current situation where they only need to be documented as 'may contain GMOs'. This, in effect, allows GM-exporting countries to avoid having to segregate GM from non-GM commodities, although public pressure may well force this anyway.

Though covered in the scope of the Protocol, two areas of GMOs were later excluded from regulation under it: GMOs intended for contained use and GMOs used for medical purposes. This is a serious shortcoming as these GMOs also have potential to cause harm to biodiversity and human health. This is especially true as 'contained use' under the Protocol is not defined in such a way as to exclude escapes of GMOs or leakages into the environment. It merely seeks to 'limit their contact with, and their impact on, the external environment'.[32] Many delegations were aware that 'contained use facilities' – such as fermentors, for example, or vials with bacterial or fungal cultures for the production of pharmaceuticals, additives or nutraceuticals – are indeed leaking or even actively discharging living organisms or their DNA into the environment. Yet delegations of the Miami Group and the European Union suppressed concerns.

In this case it became evident that the intense lobbying activity of the pharmaceutical industry in Europe, especially the UK, and North America had achieved these unfortunate exemptions. Some argue, however, that pharmaceuticals are actually covered unless they are, according to Article 4, 'addressed by other relevant international agreements or organisations'.

The Protocol clearly states that neither the WTO nor the Protocol take precedence. Although later agreements normally take precedence over earlier ones, it was actually perceived as a major victory to achieve equal status for the Protocol against major opposition from the Miami Group.

Attempts continue to be made by the US and industry to undermine, misrepresent and downgrade the Cartagena Protocol. There are also struggles over its implementation, as industry seeks to ensure that weak levels of protection are implemented and harmonised across entire regions with projects such as the Program for Biosafety Systems funded by USAID for $14.5 million. [33]

Notes

[1] Geoffrey Lean, 'Plans to Promote GM Crops Defeated', *Independent*, 2 September 2002. http://news.independent.co.uk/world/environment/story.jsp?story=329680

[2] Industry data taken from the website publication of Fortune 500/Global 500. http://www.fortune.com/indexw.jhtml?channel=list.jhtml&list_frag=list_global500.jhtml&list=19). Data on the GNP of nation states is taken from the IMF/WEO website. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/1999/01/data/ngdpd_a.csv

[3] PANOS, 'More Power to the World Trade Organisation? The International Trade Controversy', PANOS Briefing, 37 (November 1999): 7.

[4] *Guardian*, 17 November 1999.

[5] The Edmonds Institute provides an excellent list of 'revolving' office holders, from which some of the above examples were taken. See 'The Revolving Door'. http://www.edmonds-institute.org/door.html

[6] Website: <www.tabd.com> Information on the TABD can also be found in such Corporate Europe Observatory briefings as 'TABD: Putting the Business Horse before the Government Cart' (October 1999) and 'TABD: Doing Business in Berlin' (November 1999). http://www.xs4all.nl/~ceo/tabd/berlinbriefing.html

[7] Corporate Europe Observatory: http://www.xs4all.nl/~ceo/observer2/tabd.html

[8] TABD Newsletter 01/1, February/March 2001: http://www.tabd.com/about/febmar.html

[9] Corporate Europe Observatory.

[10] *Ibid*.

[11] Testimony of US co-chair Lodewijk J. R. de Vink, President and Chief Operating Officer, Warner–Lambert Company, on behalf of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, before the House Ways and Means Committee, Subcommittee on Trade (23 July 1997).

[12] TABD 1998 Mid-Year Scorecard Report.

[13] Lodewijk J. R. de Vink and Jürgen Schrempp, message to US–EU Summit, May 1998.

[14] Corporate Europe Observatory, 'TABD in Troubled Water', 3 October 2001. ceo@xs4all.nl

[15] http://www.fao.org/es/ESD/at2015/toc-e.htm

[16] Devinder Sharma, 'Rice Genome Mapping No Respite for the Hungry', *Deccan Herald* (n.d.).

[17] Agence France-Presse, 'Going Organic Cannot Help World Hunger: FAO Chief Diouf ', 17 February 2001.

[18] P. Weber, 1992, 'A Place for Pesticides?' *World Watch* (May/June 1992): 18–25. Cited in 'Experience suggests countries can significantly reduce pesticide use', Ecological Agriculture Projects, 1997; http://www.eap.mcgill.ca/MagRack/ EC/ec1–4–1.htm

[19] Final declaration from the World Food Summit, 'The International Alliance against Hunger', Rome, 2002. http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/MEETING/005/Y7106E/Y7106E09.htm

[20] Codex website: www.codexalimentarius.net

[21] *Ibid*.

[22] Lisa Lefferts, 'Changing the Rules of the Codex Club', *Pesticides News*, 43 (March 1999): 6.

[23] Corporate Watch USA website, http://www.corpwatch.org.

[24] WBCSD website: http://www.wbcsd.ch/

[25] Tewolde Berhan G. Egziabher, 'Biosafety Negotiations – Flashbacks', *Third World Resurgence*, 114/115 (2000): 24–6.

[26] http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/signinglist.asp

[27] List of Participants, Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), First Extraordinary Meeting (resumed session), 24–28 January 2000.

[28] Hartmut Meyer, 'The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety', *Biotechnology and Development Monitor*, 43 (2000): 2–7. http://www.biotech-monitor.nl/4302.htm

[29] http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp

[30] A. van Dommelen, 'The Precautionary Principle: Dealing with Controversy', *Biotechnology and Development Monitor*, 43 (2000): 8–11. http://www.biotech-monitor.nl/4304.htm

[31] 'Working towards a Strong Protocol', Editorial, *Biotechnology and Development Monitor*, 43 (2000): 2–3. http://www.biotech-monitor.nl/4301.htm

[32] Article 3 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety defines 'contained use' as follows: ' "Contained use" means any operation, undertaken within a facility, installation or other physical structure, which involves living modified organisms that are controlled by specific measures that effectively limit their contact with, and their impact on, the external environment.'

[33] http://www.fas.usda.gov/icd/summit/2002/statearchive/USAIDbiotech.htm